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We analyze the link between financial development and income inequality for a broad 
unbalanced dataset of 138 developed and developing countries over the years 1960 to 2008. 
Using credit-to-GDP as measure  of financial development, our results reject theoretical 
models predicting a negative impact of financial development on income inequality measured 
by the Gini coefficient. Controlling for country fixed effects and GDP per capita, we find that 
financial development has a positive effect on income inequality. These results are robust to 
different measures of financial development. 
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1  Introduction  
In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008-09 many public commentators argued about the 
benefits and harms of the financial sector for the rest of society. The privatization of profits and 
socialization of losses of banks is a common bon mot in political debates in many developed 
countries. Together with widening income gaps and social inequality in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany and many other countries the question of the contribution of the financial 
system to the economy and more generally to society arises. The merits of efficient financial 
systems fall short in being acknowledged by the public as bankers are recognized as highly paid 
individuals who serve only their own interest. In the view of many economists there exists a more 
benign point of view of the financial sector: Financial markets boost economic growth, enable 
wealthy as well as poor people to borrow and finance investments, and thereby ensure capital is 
distributed most efficiently. Generally, so the story goes, the more efficient and well developed 
financial markets are, the more a specific borrower can borrow with a given amount of collateral. 
The success of micro credits for the poor in developing countries is just one example of what 
banks are able to do for society.
3 There are parts of society that were not able to borrow and can 
now build their own businesses, increase income and climb the social ladder. But there are also 
more critical voices being raised recently. In particular banks and financial markets are much 
criticized for being ruthless in developed countries where almost everybody is supposed to have 
access to finance and where income inequality is a phenomenon that was thought to be part of the 
past. Anecdotal evidence appears to give arguments in favor of and against an inequality reducing 
effect of financial development.  
We therefore aim to empirically assess the link between financial development and the 
distribution of income in a society. Does financial development always reduce income inequality 
in society? Are there important differences across and within countries based on their stage of 
economic development or is the influence the same around the world independent of country 
characteristics and the time we live in? We analyze the link of financial development and income 
inequality using standard proxies in the financial development literature, the ratio of private 





In contrast to previous empirical work on this topic we reject theories that explain an income 
inequality reducing effect of financial development. Reasons why we find other results might be  
that our database covers a longer time horizon, much more countries, and we control for year 
effects and country characteristics. Moreover we split the dataset in samples according to income 
levels and still confirm that financial development measured by private credit over GDP increases 
income inequality. This result is robust to different econometric specifications. Because of these 
more general and robust findings we believe our work is of importance to the literature and the 
profession.    
While investigating the link of financial development and income inequality we do not judge or 
examine whether there is an optimal or fair level of inequality. On the one hand, higher levels of 
inequality can have boosting effects on an economy from an incentive point of view. If 
everybody was receiving the same final incomes, independent of effort, of course nobody would 
have an incentive to incur extra efforts for the production of goods and services and the economy 
would suffer. Examples are socialist countries in the second half of the 20
th century. On the other 
hand, excessive inequality can lead to social unrest and political instability.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two of the paper gives an overview 
of related literature. Section three describes the data used in our work. In section four we conduct 
the econometric analysis and section five concludes. 
 
2  Literature 
Our work adds to literature on financial development, income inequality, and economic 
development. There is an extensive literature on the link of financial development and growth. A 
good overview of theoretical as well as empirical work in this regard is given by Levine (2005). 
In general financial development is expected to enhance growth by enabling the efficient 
allocation of capital and reducing borrowing and financing constraints. But this literature does 
not address the issue of which part of the population profits from the growth enabled by financial 
development. Growth could benefit the poor by creating more employment opportunities but it 
could also favor the entrepreneurs and their profit margin. The relationship between the 
distribution of income and economic development was investigated by Kuznets (1955), who 4 
 
established the inverted U-shape path of income inequality along economic development – the 
well known Kuznets curve. Kuznets argument was that rural areas are more equal and with lower 
average income than urban areas in the beginning of industrialization and thus by the process of 
urbanization a society becomes more unequal. When a new generation of former poor rural 
people who moved to cities is born, they are able to profit from the urban possibilities. Wages of 
lower-income groups rise and overall income inequality narrows. One factor backing Kuznets 
argument of the urban possibilities is financial development, which allows former poor migrants 
to choose the education they desire and to build their own businesses. This is the basic reasoning, 
why economic theories predict a negative impact of financial development on income inequality. 
Financial development fosters the free choice regarding education and the founding of 
businesses. As both lead to growth and growth is associated with more jobs, average income will 
rise and inequality fall. The two major theoretical papers in this field are Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993). Banerjee and Newman build a model on occupational choice 
with four different options: subsistence, employment, self-employment, and entrepreneurship. 
Each individual can allocate himself to one of these sectors. However, the choice is limited by the 
initial distribution of wealth, which is based on bequest. In order to become self-employed or 
even an entrepreneur an individual needs to borrow sufficient capital. Lenders of this capital 
request collateral which can only be provided by those who inherited enough money. Poor 
individuals can thus not become self-employed or entrepreneurs. A transition across generations 
is possible, as self-employed and entrepreneurs can have high or low returns and consequently 
become relatively richer or poorer. As wages change, the descendants of employed can become 
self-employed. If capital markets were better or even perfect, monitoring techniques would 
reduce the need for collateral and enable individuals independent of their initial wealth to become 
self-employed or an entrepreneur. Financial development consequently helps to reduce income 
inequality which is based on the unequal distribution of wealth. Galor and Zeira take a similar 
approach. Income in their model depends on human capital. The higher the investments in human 
capital the higher is the return on employment. Again, initial wealth is crucial for the level of 
investment which determines whether an individual becomes a skilled or unskilled worker. 
Individuals without sufficient wealth can borrow to invest in their human capital. The borrowing 
rate depends on a world interest rate and a surcharge according to the effort the borrower needs to 
incur in order to evade the lender. The better capital markets are developed, the easier it is to 
borrow, and the more people will invest in human capital and become skilled. So once more, 5 
 
financial development leads to more equality in the income distribution. The chain of arguments 
in both models explains the use of the ratio of private credit over GDP as proxy for financial 
development. More developed markets lead to more investment in human capital and 
entrepreneurial investment for those who become self-employed or entrepreneurs. Both types of 
investments require financing by credit and financial development consequently goes hand in 
hand with higher amounts of private credit.      
In contrast to this sole inequality reducing effect of financial development, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) show how financial development can increase income inequality. But while the 
previous models were designed for labor income, Greenwood and Jovanovic look at capital 
income. They build a model in which financial development first increases inequality until it 
reaches a certain threshold and the income distribution gets more stable. This inverted U-shape is 
based on fix costs that occur when individuals want to use financial intermediaries. Greenwood 
and Jovanovic argue that in the absence of financial intermediaries, individuals can invest in low 
yielding save assets and higher yielding risky assets. By using financial intermediaries they can 
overcome problems like information asymmetries, idiosyncratic risk and maturity gaps. Financial 
intermediaries then yield a higher mean return on investments, however they charge a fixed fee as 
it is costly to provide these services. This fee cannot be provided by all individuals but as some 
invest via intermediaries, capital is better allocated and the economy grows stronger. The rising 
income levels based on the stronger economy enable more individuals to use intermediaries and 
thus when all individuals have access to financial intermediation and the different investment 
opportunities the income distribution is more equal. This model is less linked to the provision of 
credit as proxy for financial development but looks at investment opportunities. Bank deposits 
are consequently better suited to test for the Greenwood and Jovanovic hypothesis of access to 
financial intermediation on the saving side.  
Those theories are subject to empirical research that uses cross-country datasets on income 
inequality to test for the negative and inverted U-shaped relationships of financial development 
and income distribution. Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2003) test these different theories. Using a dataset 
of 91 countries over the period from 1960 to 1995 and averaging the data over five-year periods 
they confirm the theories of Kuznets (1955), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Galor and Zeira 
(1993) and reject the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model. As a measure of financial 
development they test both, private credit over GDP and deposit money Bank deposits over GDP. 6 
 
Control variables are GDP per capita and its squared term in order to follow Kuznets curve. 
Further control variables include risk of expropriation, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
government consumption, inflation and the share of the modern sector. Besides the linear 
negative impact of financial development on income inequality, the maximum of Kuznets curve 
is calculated – depending on the econometric specification – as about 1,400 USD and 2,350 USD. 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2004) also test the three theories about the impact of financial 
development. They use private credit over GDP as proxy for financial development and in 
contrast to Clarke et al. use not 5-year averages but the average over the whole time horizon 
covered per country with a between estimator. Their 52-country sample from 1960 to 1999 also 
confirms the linear negative influence of financial development on income inequality. Li, Squire, 
and Zou (1998) explain variations in income inequality across countries and time. They 
approximate financial development as M2 over GDP, which is negative and significant in their 
sample of 49 countries. They also distinguish between the effect of financial development on 
poor and rich and find that it helps both groups. Further research that backs Galor and Zeira and 
Banerjee and Newman is for example Kappel (2010), who uses a sample of 59 countries for a 
cross-country analysis and 78 countries for a panel analysis over the period 1960 to 2006. Kappel 
also distinguishes between high and low income countries. While credit over GDP is still 
significant and negative for high income countries, it does not show any influence for low income 
countries. Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2008) investigate income inequality with a focus on 
trade and financial globalization. In their sample of 51 countries from 1981 to 2003 they have the 
measure of private credit over GDP only as control variable. In contrast to Beck et al. and Clarke 
et al. they get a positive and significant coefficient for financial development in all different 
econometric specifications of their estimation. Without explicitly stating it they thus reject the 
theories explained above and contradict work which just focuses on the financial development 
inequality link. All the described studies have in common that they look at a broad set of 
countries, development over time, and the theories we described in detail. Furthermore they start 
with simple OLS estimations and pursue with two stage least squares estimation to tackle 
eventual omitted variable biases. Both, random effect and between models are used but no study 
compared fixed effect estimations with their results. Further empirical research (natural 
experiments, household studies, firm- and industry-level analyses, and case studies) on the link 
between financial development and income inequality is summarized in Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine (2009).      7 
 
Our research adds value to the afore mentioned literature especially in the scope of analysis. The 
basic sample consists of 138 countries with observations covering the years 1960 to 2008. In total 
we use 3228 country-year observations and 802 observations for the estimation with five-year 
averages. The large sample also allows us to distinguish between the effect of financial 
development in different country groups regarding income and region. This is to the best of our 
knowledge the largest dataset for an analysis of financial development and income inequality in 
terms of years as well as countries. Previous publications further showed the relation of GDP per 
capita on income distribution and financial development on income distribution as two 
dimensional graphs, not allowing for an interaction between the two explanatory variables. 
Plotting a 3D-figure suggests that while Kuznets curve still holds, financial development leads to 
higher inequality holding GDP per capita constant. This paper in addition controls for year effects 
with year dummies and country characteristics in order to isolate the effect of financial 
development and to reduce the omitted variable bias. 
 
3  Data 
Description of dataset 
We combine different datasets to derive the largest dataset for an analysis of financial 
development and income inequality. Income inequality is measured as gross income before 
redistribution using the Gini coefficient. The underlying source is Solt’s Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (2009), which “is the most comprehensive attempt at 
developing a cross-nationally comparable database of Gini indices across time” [Ortiz and 
Cummins (2011), p. 17]. The SWIID uses the World Income Inequality Database by the United 
Nations University, which is the successor of Deininger and Squire’s (1996) database, data from 
the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), Branko Milanovic’s World Income Distribution data, the 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America, and the ILO’s Household Income and Expenditure 
Statistics. The total coverage is at 171 countries with 4285 country-year observations. The other 
important source for our research is the updated 2010 version of the Financial Structure Database 
by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2009). They collected data on both of our measures for 
financial development – private credit divided by GDP and bank deposits divided by GDP. 
Private credit is calculated based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and consists of 8 
 
credit provided by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector. It 
does not include credit provided to the state or by central banks. Bank deposits is also based on 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and consists of demand, time and saving deposits in 
deposit money banks. Both variables are standard measures of financial development and used in 
the empirical literature described above. GDP per capita is used in constant USD and sourced 
from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
definitions and sources of all variables used in our analysis. 
Table 1: Overview of variables and sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Gini  Gini coefficient of gross income  Solt (2009) 
Financial Development (1) –  
Private Credit/GDP 
Private credit divided by GDP; 
claims on the private sector by 
deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions  
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2009) 
Financial Development (2) –  
Bank deposits/GDP 
Bank deposits divided by GDP; 
demand, time and saving deposits in 
deposit money banks 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2009) 
GDP per capita  Constant 2000 USD; Country groups 
based on four income categories 
(High, upper middle, lower middle, 
and low income) 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Legal origin  Dummy variable regarding the origin 
of the legal system (UK, France, 
German, Scandinavian, Socialist) 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny 
(2008) 
Inflation  Consumer price index; change on 
previous year 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Agricultural Sector  Value-added by the agricultural 
sector as a share of GDP 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Government Consumption  Government share in total 
expenditure 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Access to Finance  Different measures for the access to 
finance, e.g. number of ATMs per 
100.000 inhabitants, minimum 
amount required to borrow as ratio 
over GDP p.c. 
Financial Access Survey, 
International Monetary Fund (2011) 
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Private credit over GDP can be used as proxy for financial development as it reflects the ease to 
get credit for households and corporations. The more credit provided to the private sector, the 
easier it was for private institutions to signal their creditworthiness at the respective lending rate 
and the more private individuals were able to have access to credit markets. This argumentation 
does not always hold as can be seen with real estate credits and the subprime crisis in the United 
States in 2007-08. Furthermore we do not have micro level data regarding the distribution of 
credit in the population and among businesses and can consequently not asses how different 
groups in the population benefit from increasing credit provision and how those credits are used. 
Still we do believe that it is a good proxy for financial development as there is a high correlation 
between private credit over GDP and the access to finance measured by the number of ATMs or 
number of bank branches per population or per square mile.
4 The alternative measure we use, 
bank deposits over GDP, serves as a proxy as it describes again the access to finance. Without or 
with less financial development, less people had access to bank accounts. Lower values of bank 
deposits over GDP also reflect the lack of trust of creditors in their financial system and their 
banks. There are again some caveats as we do not know the distribution of bank deposits among 
the population and businesses and we have no data on the turnover rate of the deposits. Overall, 
both measures explain how well the financial system performs its inherent task – channeling 
funds and intermediating between creditors and debtors.  
 
Income inequality over time around the world 
Income inequality measured as gini coefficient is normally distributed for the whole sample with 
a mean of 44.3, standard deviation of 9.6, skewness of .36 and kurtosis of 3.0. Income inequality 
in general changes only slowly over time. Splitting the sample in observations by year, the gini 
becomes more normally distributed over time with lower standard deviations. This process is 
accompanied by higher means. Figure A1 shows the distribution of inequality around the world 
measured as average over the years 2000 to 2004. Inequality is highest in Latin America and 
Southern Africa. Very high and increasing levels of inequality can also be observed in developed 
countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However the level of net 




figure 1. Even countries that are considered as being very equal, like Sweden, have a high level 
of gross income inequality. This examples shows that in discussing equality aspects one has to be 
explicit whether equality before or after redistribution is considered. As the returns to human 
capital investment and the founding of businesses are measured as gross income before taxes and 
redistribution, we regard only gross income inequality in our research. In Germany and Sweden 
net inequality is relatively constant compared to gross inequality in contrary to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, where net and gross inequality move parallel. The level of 
redistribution in those countries does not change when inequality increases or decreases.
5     




Financial development over time around the world 
Financial development defined by the measure of private credit over GDP is increasing over time. 
This process is more monotone than the development of gross inequality. The mean for the whole 
sample is .45 with a standard deviation of .39. Figure A2 shows the stage of financial 
development for the countries in our sample for the years 2000 to 2004. As expected, financial 
development is especially high in OECD countries with the highest levels in countries of Anglo-
Saxon origin. The countries with the highest values are Iceland, Luxembourg, and the United 
States. The distribution of financial development across countries and time is not as normal as 
inequality so that we transform the variable with logs. This changes the skewness from 1.5 to -.3 
and the kurtosis from 5.0 to 2.8.
6 In contrast to inequality credit over GDP becomes more 
uniformly distributed across countries over time, when looking at different income country 
groups. So we do not observe a convergence to one level but rather that some countries keep 
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4  Econometric Estimation 
Basic estimation 
We test the hypothesis of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993), namely that 
financial development has a negative impact on income inequality and the hypothesis of 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) that the influence follows an inverted U-shape. Our basic 
estimation to compare this data with previous work is: 
     ,     	          ,             , 
   	      	 . . ,  	      	 . . , 
      ,  
Following the hypothesis of a linear negative influence,    should be negative and significant and 
  should be insignificant. According to the inverted U-shape hypothesis,    should be significant 
and positive and   should be significant and negative. We add GDP per capita and its squared 
term to control for Kuznets curve. Therefore    should be positive and significant and    should 
be negative and significant. Gini is normally distributed and rather stable and consequently not 
transformed into logs. Both Credit and GDP p.c. are transformed into logs, as both variables have 
a skewed distribution. The square of the variables is taken from the log. Our control measure for 
financial development is Bank deposits which is also log-linearized and treated like Credit. We 
estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS). One impediment to our estimation is 
heteroskedasticity, which we handle by using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
Furthermore there are different approaches on how to proceed with yearly data.
7 Yearly data 
represent cyclical movements while using five-year averages yields a more balanced panel but at 
the same time means a loss of a lot of information. Table 2 shows a comparison of the two 











Table 2: Basic estimation 
Income inequality measured as Gini coefficient is the dependent variable for all models. Model 1 is using yearly data 
and model 2 is using five-year averages. Model a is estimated with default heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
Model b uses cluster robust standard errors. Max/Min of Credit and GDP indicate at which level the sign of the 
explanatory variable changes. Neither country fixed effects nor time dummies are included in order to make the 





(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Credit -3.70339***  -3.70339  -3.17382  -3.17382 
Credit²  0.69142*** 0.69142  0.58253*** 0.58253 
GDP p.c.  12.9570***  12.9570**  13.39131***  13.39131*** 
GDP  p.c.²  -0.90697*** -0.90697*** -0.92665*** -0.92665*** 
Constant  6.37289 6.37289 3.90105 3.90105 
N  3,228 3,228 802  802 
R²  0.0719 0.0719 0.0656 0.0656 
Max/Min  of:      
Credit (in %)  15%  not significant  strict. positive  not significant 
GDP (in USD)  1,265  1,265  1,374  1,374 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
Independent of the measure of financial development and the treatment of the use of yearly or 
five-year averaged data we confirm Kuznets hypothesis on the relation of economic development 
and income inequality. Inequality rises with increasing GDP per capita and falls after a certain 
level is reached. In the overall sample the maximum Gini is reached between 1,265 to 1,374 
USD. This result is in line with Clarke et al. (2003) who estimate the maximum inequality 
between 1,250 and 2,350 USD. Using yearly data, financial development first lowers income 
inequality and after reaching a specific stage of development increases income inequality. For 
five-year averages financial development has a positive impact if it is approximated by credit. 
Using bank deposits as proxy for financial development, we do not see a significant effect on the 
income distribution in the basic estimation. These findings contradict the outcome of Clarke et al. 
and suggest that financial development works in the opposite way of what is suggested by the 
theory. In a second step we correct the default standard errors in the pooled OLS estimation for 13 
 
clustered data.
8 Cluster robust standard errors should to be used as the default standard errors 
assume that errors i are uncorrelated over i for fixed t. Kuznets curve remains apparent but the 
link of financial development and income inequality disappears. In order to perform a more 
thorough test of the theories named above, we make further adjustments on the basic estimation. 
We control for a time factors by using time dummy variables (cf. Table A1). This step increases 
the R² by about 6 percentage points in model 2 and by about 3 percentage points in model 1. The 
Kuznets curve still holds but the turning point for GDP per capita is a bit lower at about 1,140 
USD. Financial development follows the same pattern as in the basic estimation, however all 
variables are highly significant when we do not control for clusters. This adjustment also leads to 
a significantly positive effect of financial development with cluster robust standard errors.  
 
Econometric hurdles 
Former research took endogeneity into account and used an instrumental variable approach to 
estimate the impact of financial development for the case that inequality influences financial 
development or in case of an omitted variable bias. Results did not differ from the OLS approach 
a lot. Instruments for financial development were in line with literature on financial development 
the origin of a country’s legal system. We follow the same approach and use legal origin 
dummies as exogenous instruments. The first stage R² is 57% in our sample when we include 
GDP p.c. and the time dummies. The fitted values for credit have a correlation of 76% with the 
original values and can consequently be viewed as having a good fit. However, the existing 
theories we test do not allow for an influence of inequality on financial development so that we 
do not pursue further attempts to correct for reverse causality in our robustness checks. An 
endogeneity problem might also occur due to omitted variables. We address this issue by using a 
fixed effects regression including time dummies. This is the main difference in our econometric 
approach from previous research. Country dummies are included to control for country specific 
characteristics that do not change over time but are potentially influential regarding income 
inequality. These can be cultural factors, religion, colonial background and others. Time 





or business cycle fluctuations in our explanatory variables, as we expect Credit and GDP p.c. to 
grow over time as countries become more developed and richer. Another problem often occurring 
in estimations is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity reduces the power of the OLS-estimator but 
the estimator is still unbiased and efficient. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shows a high 
multicollinearity which is due to the structure of our base estimation with linear and squared 
terms of financial and economic development. Estimating the influence of financial and 
economic development on income inequality with either linear or squared terms reveals a low 
result for the VIF and confirms that multicollinearity is not an issue in the estimation.  
The estimations in table 2 are object to an omitted variable bias since no country specific effects 
that explain income inequality are included. Thus, as a next step we control for country specific 
effects by conducting a fixed effect estimation. Fixed effects are not a cure for all omitted 
variable problems as time variant country characteristics are not included, but it is a good 
approach to tackle a potential omitted variable bias (cf. Acemoglu et al. (2008)). A further 
potential critique regarding the estimation process is endogeneity caused by reverse causality. 
One way to solve reverse causality is to use a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.  
 
Within estimation 
Key to our paper is the explanation of the influence of financial development on income 
inequality within and not between countries. To estimate this influence we use the fixed-effect 
estimator, also known as within estimator. The within estimator has the advantage of controlling 
for country characteristics and in contrast to the between estimator using all observations of the 
dataset and developments over time. The results of the within-estimation are shown in table 3. 
Although we do not believe that reverse causality is an issue regarding financial development we 
also report the results of a 2SLS estimation in table 3. As before, yearly data and five year 
averages produce similar coefficients. So we shall regard only yearly data in the remainder of this 
paper. Focusing on the sole effect of GDP per capita and financial development we do neither 




Table 3: Fixed effect and 2SLS estimation 
Model 3 is using yearly data and model 4 is using five-year averages. Model a is estimated with fixed effects. Model 
b is also a fixed effects model but uses 2SLS with legal origin dummies as instruments in the first stage regression. 
Both models are calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Max/Min of Credit and GDP p.c.  indicate 
at which level the sign of the explanatory variable changes. Both models include time dummies. The estimation with 




(3a) fixed effect  (3b) fe-2SLS  (4a) fixed effect  (4b) fe-2SLS 
Credit 2.2863***  -28.5547***  2.5671***  omitted  (collinear.) 
Credit² not  significant
1  3.3789*** not  significant
1 omitted (collinear.) 
GDP p.c.  -21.1659***  20.0077*  -24.0970***  -14.2786*** 
GDP p.c.²  1.3970***  -0.8969  1.5619***  1.1003*** 
Constant 122.3372***  0.7713  133.9544***  94.5933*** 
N  3228 3896 802  968 
R²  0.1793 0.1692 0.247  0.1972 
Max/Min  of:      
Credit (in %)  strict. positive  68.4%  strict. positive  --- 
GDP (in USD)  1.950  strict. positive  2,240  658 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
1both terms for credit are insignificant in a quadratic estimation so that the credit only enters linearly in the model 
 
Independent of the time specification and the inclusion of dummy variables we reject the 
hypothesis that financial development is monotonously reducing inequality. Enhanced credit 
provision benefits the poor more than the rich only for very low levels of private credit to GDP. 
Estimating a more thorough model leads to the same result, the rejection of a negative influence 
of financial development on income inequality. The idea of the first part of Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) that the use of financial intermediation does not hamper poor but favor rich 
people is supported in parts by this analysis and also holds when using bank deposits as proxy. 
While the fixed effects model estimates a strictly positive impact the instrumental variable 
approach can explain both models for a certain range of financial development. Until a credit 
provision to GDP of 68%, financial development reduces inequality which backs Galor and Zeira 
and Banerjee and Newman. Inequality increases after this threshold which might be due to 
different investment opportunities as argued by Greenwood and Jovanovic. Our model that 16 
 
corrects for fixed effects has a within R² of 18%. So besides the high significance level of all 
included variables we can explain a large part of within country variation in inequality by 
financial development. A surprising result of the analysis is the inverted U-shape of GDP per 
capita. When the average income rises, inequality falls only until a level of about 1,950 to 2,240 
USD and rises afterwards.  
 
Robustness checks   
We conduct several robustness checks in order to control for the validity of our results. These 
checks include estimations for subsamples of countries, the inclusion of different control 
variables and further support for the ratio of private credit over GDP as measure for financial 
development. Due to the large database we are able to investigate whether the effects on income 
inequality hold for different country groups. Therefore we split the sample into four groups 
according to the income categories defined by the World bank. The high income group consists 
of 1285 country-year observations, the upper middle income group of 739, the lower middle 
income group of 765, and the low income group of 439. All estimations are performed with 
within-estimators and yearly data, including time dummies to identify the influence of financial 
and economic development on the variation of income inequality independent of a time factor 
and country specific characteristics. Robust standard errors are used when necessary. We expect 
the signs of the coefficients for economic and financial development as follows:  
Table 4 
  Low Inc.  Lower Middle Inc.  Upper Middle Inc.  High Income  Rational 




Positive  negative   
Kuznets 
GDP²  Insig.  insig.  negative insig.  Negative insig.     






negative  Greenw. & 
Jovan.  FD²  Insig.  insig.  negative insig.  Negative negative  insig. 
 
Depending on the exact turning point in the models of Kuznets and Greenwood and Jovanovic 
the squared term of financial development in the lower and upper middle income group might be 
insignificant. Table 5 shows the estimation results by country group.  17 
 
Table 5: Fixed effect estimation by income group 
All estimations are fixed effect estimations with time dummies and robust standard errors. Max/Min of Credit and 




Low Income  Lower Middle Inc.  Upper Middle Inc.  High Income 
Credit 2.5154  1.8022*  1.6672**  2.4138** 
Credit² not  significant
1  not significant
1 not  significant
1 not significant
1 
GDP p.c.  8.3755  25.7006*  -4.9684*  -28.9424 
GDP p.c.²  -.6337  -1.9114*  not significant
1 1.5171 
Constant 19.9369  -30.5024 91.3123***  169.3075* 
N  439 765 739 1285 
Within-R²  0.3586 0.3262 0.3964 0.2056 
Max/Min  of:      
Credit (in %)  not significant  strictly positive  strictly positive  strictly positive 
GDP (in USD)  not significant  831  strictly negative  not significant 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
1both terms for credit are insignificant in a quadratic estimation so that the credit only enters linearly in the model 
 
By combining the income groups we can observe Kuznets curve, although GDP is not a 
significant explanatory variable in low and high income countries: 
 


























The relation of financial development and income inequality is close to Greenwood and 
Jovanovic. In all but low income countries rich people profit more from a higher distribution of 
credit than poor people. For low income countries financial development is not a relevant factor 
for income inequality. Although the ratio of credit over GDP is significant, the absolute effect is 
low. With credit being measured in logs and Gini in absolute levels a coefficient of 2.4 means 
that a 10% increase in credit leads to a 0.24 increase of the Gini. Estimating the different income 
groups with interaction terms instead of subsamples confirms that financial development has a 
significant high positive effect for high income countries and a significant positive but lower 
effect for upper middle income countries. Lower middle income and low income countries’ 
interaction terms are not significant.  
For further robustness checks besides the analysis of subsamples we use different control 
variables. One control variable we include is legal origin as dummy when not using the fixed 
effect estimation.  Legal origin is a standard instrument in the financial development literature. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2007) give a detailed overview of research dealing with 
the importance of legal origins for economic development and explain the differences of legal 
systems. They also address the criticism related to legal origin as an instrument but conclude in 
their “Legal Origins Theory” that this variable is significant in explaining growth. Legal origin is 
of importance for explaining differences in income inequality as it also reflects cultural and 
historical factors. La Porta et al. (2007, p.37) see the French civil law family as more concerned 
with market failure and “as a system of social control of economic life”. In contrast the common 
law family, originated in Britain, deals more with state abuse.
9 As the civil law family more 
mirrors social concerns it is more likely to be associated with lower income inequality. So we add 
legal origin in our base regression as a control variable. Including legal origin dummy variables 
gives a higher R², which increases from 7% to 14% in the basic estimation and to 17% if year 
dummies are included.
10 French and German legal origins – the civil law family – reduce 
inequality significantly by 3.5 and 7.9 points. UK origin does not have a significant effect. Using 
bank deposits instead of credit over GDP as proxy reveals similar results. Credit reduces 
inequality in this estimation only until a very low level and increases inequality afterwards. This 






GDP. In the category of high income countries, Anglo-Saxon countries are disproportionally 
represented among the top positive correlations: United Kingdom (N=49,    0.92), New 
Zealand (N=45,    0.91), Canada (N=46,    0.84), United States (N=49,    0.78), and 
Australia (N=49,    0.66) all have a large number of observations and very high correlations of 
income inequality and the provision of private credit. Further control variables we add in our 
within estimation are inflation, the share of government consumption and the share of the 
agricultural sector in total GDP. Inflation should have a positive sign if the upper class with 
access to financial instruments could protect its wealth against inflation and the working class 
was more severely hit due to sticky wages. Government consumption was included in previous 
research as a higher government share reflects the magnitude of redistribution. We do not expect 
a significant sign as this is relevant for the net income inequality but does influence gross income 
inequality. The share of the agricultural sector in total GDP, which could also be replaced by the 
share of the modern sector, is important as more agricultural work is often associated with more 
inequality due to the low skill workers employed in the agricultural sector. Depending on the 
combination of these control variables, whether all or just some are included, variables change 
the size of the coefficients and partly the significance level, but the key result persists: Depending 
on the exact model specification financial development either does not influence income 
inequality at all or has a positive effect and increases the gini coefficient.
11 Another check we do 
is to control for a steady time trend instead of using year dummies. The time trend assumes a 
constant development from the 1960s to the 2000s but is not appropriate to measure effects of 
single years. The time trend turns out be significant and negative, implying that inequality is 
generally reduced over the last 50 years. This is also supported by the year dummies, of which 
most are significant and negative and of which the size increases especially in the 1980s. Still, the 
inequality increasing effect of financial development persists. Using lagged variables of the 
explanatory variables to address a time lag in the relation with inequality does not improve our 
fit. The significance levels are similar as well as the sign of the coefficients but the size of the 
coefficients is reduced and the R² decreases.  
The main critic to our research concerns the measure of financial development. Does the 
magnitude of credit provision really indicate financial development? We strongly believe yes. 




intermediaries were not able to assess credit risk, to overcome a maturity mismatch and to pool 
savings, they would provide less credit to households and enterprises. Second, the amount of 
credit could be biased towards few borrowers with high amounts outstanding and many 
borrowers with low amounts of credit and even more potential borrowers with no access to 
finance at all. We address this argument which aims at the question whether the amount of credit 
mirrors the access to finance by investigating the link of access to finance and the ratio of credit 
over GDP. The IMF’s Financial Access Survey (2011) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Beck (2007) 
provide different measures for the access to financial intermediaries. Correlations of these 
measures with credit are shown in table 6. 
Table 6: Access to finance and the provision of credit 
The number of ATMs is taken from the IMF’s Financial Access Survey. The other measures are taken from the 
World bank.  
Correlation 
coefficients 















to SMEs as % 
of GDP p.c.
1 
Share of adult population with 





0.74 0.61 0.57 -0.29 0.69   
# countries  71  39  86  48  80   
1Year may differ by country, credit over GDP is taken as average from 1999 to 2003 
 
The measures for access to finance are only available as cross section and not as panel data and 
differ with regards to the number of countries covered. The number of ATMs per 100,000 
inhabitants indicates how many people use bank accounts. If credit and bank access were only 
relevant for few, there were less ATMs. The correlation of 0.74 for a set of 71 countries backs 
our use of credit as proxy for financial development. The number of bank branches and number 
of loans point in the same direction. If only a small proportion of the population would use 
financial intermediaries for the provision of credit, there were fewer banks and fewer loans. 
Financial development in the sense of Banerjee and Newman (1993) means that funding for small 
and medium enterprises gets easier. Especially small loans would help start a business or grow a 
small business. The minimum loan volume should also be lower in better developed financial 21 
 
markets as more credit processes should be more efficient and worthwhile for banks even for 
relatively lower amounts of credit. The negative correlation of minimum loan volume with total 
credits confirms this. The lower the minimum credit volumes are the higher is the provision of 
credit. The fifth indicator we use is based on survey data and measures the overall access of the 
adult population to a bank account. Even developed countries in the European Union have values 
below 100% as some people abstain from banking voluntarily or involuntarily due to 
discrimination or the fee structure. Again, more people using financial services are correlated 
with higher amounts of credit. All these correlations over different measures and different sets of 
countries support the use of the private credit over GDP ratio as proxy for financial development.      
 
5 Conclusion 
Two phenomena can be observed over the last five decades around the world – increasing 
financial development and increasing gross income inequality in many countries, especially in the 
developed world. We presented theoretical models which explain the link of financial 
development and income inequality and predict that more developed financial markets lead to 
decreasing levels of income inequality regarding labor and entrepreneurial income and first 
increasing and then decreasing levels regarding capital income. Earlier empirical research 
focusing on this financial development versus income inequality nexus confirmed the decreasing 
effect of financial development. This research is either built upon a pure cross-country 
perspective that cannot account for the many country inherent characteristics, or used panel data 
approaches but again neglecting country characteristics.  
Using a broader data set and time-invariant country specifics in our panel estimation, we reach a 
different conclusion in the analysis of this nexus and reject those earlier theories and previous 
empirical research. Integrating time-invariant country characteristics we find a positive relation 
between financial development and income inequality within countries. More developed financial 
markets lead to higher gross income inequality. This holds for several robustness checks, e.g. for 
subsamples by different income groups, neglecting country characteristics and including further 
control variables, as well as bank deposits as an alternative measure for financial development. 
The positive relation is highly significant but only of small magnitude. An increase of the 
provision of credit by ten percent leads to an increase in the gini coefficient by 0.23 for the within 22 
 
estimation.
12 We do not exclude the possibility that all income groups within a country benefit 
from more financial development, but we do find that those who are already better off benefit 
more because income inequality is increasing. These results add to the existing literature on 
financial development and income inequality by using new estimation techniques and a dataset 
with more countries for a longer time horizon compared to previous research. Still, the 
relationship between finance, financial development and income inequality offers more research 
opportunities. Work on the development of top incomes (e.g. Kaplan and Rauh (2010), Atkinson 
et al. (2009)) shows how the top earners increased their share of overall income in developed and 
developing countries and disaggregates for example income types or professions of these top 
earners. As capital income is not the main source for increasing income of the super rich, the 
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Table A1: Correlation analysis 
Complete Dataset (N=3228) 
 Gini  Credit  GDP  p.c. 
Gini 1.000     
Credit -0.089*** 1.000   
GDP p.c.  -0.145***  0.753***  1.000 
 
  High Income (N=1285)  Upper Middle Income (N=739) 
  Gini  Credit  GDP p.c.  Gini  Credit  GDP p.c. 
Gini  1.000    1.000    
Credit 0.142*** 1.000    0.298*** 1.000   
GDP  p.c.  0.048***  0.642*** 1.000  0.054 0.235*** 1.000 
Gini  1.000    1.000    
Credit  -0.083**  1.000  0.048  1.000  
GDP  p.c. 0.242*** 0.511***  1.000  0.256*** 0.259***  1.000 
  Lower Middle Income (N=765)  Low Income (N=439) 
      *,**,*** represent the significance level of the correlation coefficient (10%, 5%, and 1%); the correlations were 










Table A2: Basic estimation including year dummies 
Income inequality measured as Gini coefficient is the dependent variable for all models. Model 1 is using yearly 
data, model 2 is using five-year averages. Model a is estimated with default heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
Model b uses cluster robust standard errors. Max/Min of Credit and GDP indicate at which level the sign of the 
explanatory variable changes. No country fixed effects are included in order to make the results comparable previous 




(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Credit -5.7492***  -5.7492  -5.8931***  -5.8931 
Credit² 1.0560***  1.0560*  1.1047***  1.1047* 
GDP  p.c.  13.2149*** 13.2149**  13.5980*** 13.5980*** 
GDP  p.c.² -.9399*** -.9399*** -.9660*** -.9660*** 
Constant 12.5557**  12.5557  11.3687  11.3687 
N  3228 3228 802  802 
R²  .1063 .1063 .127  .127 
Max/Min  of:      
Credit (in %)  15%  strict. positive  7%  strict. positive 
GDP (in USD)  1,130  1,130  1,140  1,140 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
Table A3: First stage regression - credit 
Legal origin dummies for common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law are used as 
instruments in the first stage regression to predict private credit. Time dummies are included in the regression but not 
reported. GDP p.c. is in logs.  
Dep. var: Credit  Coefficient  Rob. Standard Error  z-Value  p-Value 
Legal origin UK  0.5686  0.2407  2.36  0.018 
Legal origin FR  0.3737  0.2437  1.53  0.125 
Legal origin GE  0.1809  0.1939  0.93  0.351 
Legal origin SC  omitted because of collinearity     
GDP p.c.  0.6389  0.0622  10.27  0.000 
Constant -2.7643  0.6569  -4.21  0.000 
N 3222       
R² - within  0.4028       
R² - between  0.6397       
R² - overall  0.5732       
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Table A4: Robustness check with Bank deposits 
Bank deposits are used as proxy for financial development. All models are estimated with time dummies and robust 




Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS-Cluster  Fixed effects  2SLS 
Bank deposits  -5.7635***  -5.7635  2.0586**  -37.5294*** 
Bank deposits²  0.7949***  0.7949  not significant
1 4.4650*** 
GDP p.c.  11.6622***  11.6622**  -20.2463***  20.7304** 
GDP  p.c.²  -0.7986*** -0.7986*** 1.3735***  -1.0128 
Constant 18.4904***  18.4904  116.7194***  22.2233 
N  3,239 3,239 3,239 3,896 
Within-R²  0.0926 0.0926 0.1689 0.1805 
Max/Min  of:      
Bank deposits (in %)  37.5%  not significant  strict. positive  66.9% 
GDP (in USD)  1,483  1,483  1,588  27,837 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
1 Both terms of bank deposit in the quadratic form are insignificant, but bank deposits is significant in its linear form 
 
Table A5: First stage regression – bank deposits 
Legal origin dummies for common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law are used as 
instruments in the first stage regression to predict bank deposits. Time dummies are included in the regression but 
not reported. GDP p.c. is in logs.  
Dep. var: Bank 
deposits 
Coefficient Rob.  Standard  Error  z-Value  p-Value 
Legal origin UK  0.6834  0.2035  3.36  0.001 
Legal origin FR  0.4298  0.1944  2.21  0.027 
Legal origin GE  0.3549  0.1616  2.20  0.028 
Legal origin SC  omitted because of collinearity     
GDP p.c.  0.5327  0.0524  10.16  0.000 
Constant -1.7323  0.5788  -2.99  0.003 
N 3233       
R² - within  0.4482       
R² - between  0.6399       
R² - overall  0.5656       
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Table A7: Income inequality and financial development by country 
Only country-year observations with information on income inequality (Gini), financial development (credit), 
and GDP per capita are included in the table, as other information were not used for the estimation. 
   Gini      Credit 
Country  N  Mean Min  Max    Mean Min  Max 
High  Income    1285 42.84 25.01 64.37    74.57  7.04  269.76 
Australia  44 39.76 31.29 43.96    50.24 19.31  121.43 
Austria  33 42.85 33.08 51.81    80.59 38.14  111.58 
Bahamas,  The  32 54.05 48.20 61.43    50.96 31.85 69.94 
Barbados  28 45.56 40.46 52.16    40.93 31.01 49.94 
Belgium  36 34.01 25.01 51.29    45.82 11.23 93.70 
Canada  46 39.46 35.82 43.82    78.13 17.73  183.83 
Croatia  14 34.87 32.40 38.21    42.67 24.98 67.32 
Cyprus  19 42.59 37.00 47.44    140.18 91.21  200.80 
Czech  Republic  15 35.50 33.58 36.81    48.72 29.21 69.25 
Denmark 47  48.70 45.43 54.55 54.76 22.02  209.82
Estonia  16 48.79 43.93 51.56    41.50  9.47 99.25 
Finland  44 42.96 36.38 64.37    55.73 37.18 93.26 
France  35 42.22 31.28 54.70    73.82 22.36  106.75 
Germany  37 46.36 31.43 55.95    91.10 63.09  116.93 
Greece  41 44.67 38.55 55.23    37.04 13.48 91.66 
Hong  Kong  16 54.37 47.17 59.54    146.53  124.36  176.76 
Hungary  26 41.00 28.16 48.28    33.78 16.18 64.21 
Iceland  4 41.65 40.31 43.01    181.12  116.44  269.76 
Ireland  44 44.45 38.87 47.43    70.71 30.42  205.77 
Israel  30 41.29 30.67 45.08    57.34 31.66 88.39 
Italy  42 45.23 38.18 51.12    64.67 47.56  103.33 
Japan  45 37.87 34.26 41.70    126.38 51.27  200.61 
Korea,  Rep.  38 39.69 35.16 45.97    84.09 36.41  144.59 
Latvia  15 47.19 42.15 53.20    34.42  7.04 94.72 
Luxembourg  31 36.39 27.55 43.96    102.30 56.07  211.42 
Malta  8 45.75 43.65 48.62    106.02  101.81  112.37 
Netherlands  43 41.48 37.54 53.74    101.34 41.61  192.60 
New  Zealand  45 40.03 33.07 47.00    60.55 23.76  140.14 
Norway  42 42.32 37.74 48.13    85.28 58.16  113.89 
Poland  19 41.13 34.01 47.97    23.70 14.87 40.55 
Portugal  32 53.44 46.42 61.05    90.08 47.99  171.69 
Singapore  44 46.98 42.30 53.13   87.45  35.03  135.74 
Slovak  Republic  15 33.98 29.75 36.83    40.90 29.60 52.87 
Slovenia  17 33.55 29.20 35.35    38.03 19.45 80.95 
Spain  35 38.81 32.93 46.65    87.25 63.67  188.49 
Sweden  49 44.60 36.94 51.09   89.64  51.37  134.88 
Switzerland  26 42.29 39.17 56.64    146.44  100.84  162.99 
Trinidad  a.  Tobago  34 44.69 37.83 64.06    39.84 12.28 62.16 
United  Kingdom  49 43.30 37.30 48.78    70.33 16.05  189.56 






   Gini    Credit 
Country N  Mean  Min  Max    Mean  Min  Max 
Upper Middle Income  739 49.49 27.52 77.28   32.31  2.80  155.25
Albania 10 32.27 30.62 35.13   5.46  2.80  11.81
Algeria 23 37.71 35.28 40.75   26.11  4.14  68.29
Argentina 22 46.20 43.04 50.38   16.17  9.77  25.18
Botswana 24 55.86 52.60 59.64   12.68  6.54  19.65
Brazil 17 56.45 52.66 58.53   35.26  27.03  54.49
Bulgaria 17 32.62 27.52 38.39   34.22  8.94  68.19
Chile 30 52.76 50.91 54.45   52.84  11.08  74.34
Colombia 41 58.53 48.86 67.50   25.34  16.83  35.65
Costa Rica  38 48.55 43.30 60.89   22.45  10.47  51.96
Dominica 1 41.41 41.41 41.41   63.30  63.30  63.30
Dominican Republic  22 48.86 45.91 50.44   22.20  14.80  30.75
Fiji 17 52.46 50.30 54.29   26.51  18.04  38.25
Gabon 8 57.68 42.74 70.66   12.82  7.89  16.37
Grenada 1 53.19 53.19 53.19   67.08  67.08  67.08
Iran 35 47.26 42.95 53.25   28.16  18.64  43.62
Jamaica 37 59.57 47.56 77.28   22.95  13.15  30.66
Kazakhstan 13 37.11 34.01 41.94   14.72  4.97  36.83
Lithuania 15 47.83 47.07 48.71   23.30  10.22  61.23
Macedonia, FYR  14 32.88 29.72 38.94   23.66  17.38  37.01
Malaysia 38 51.85 40.32 67.17   75.53  7.10  155.25
Mauritius 31 47.98 39.73 56.62   38.34  20.63  72.35
Mexico 42 51.49 46.72 68.75   20.36  8.69  37.10
Panama 44 52.22 47.97 57.37   51.24  10.51  97.32
Peru 20 47.65 44.34 51.01   16.94  3.16  27.89
Romania 12 43.19 40.46 49.79   14.45  6.43  36.87
Russian Federation  16 47.48 43.48 51.34   18.78  6.78  48.54
Serbia 6 41.13 40.29 41.77   22.01  16.31  27.98
Seychelles 1 57.59 57.59 57.59   22.45  22.45  22.45
South Africa  38 65.45 61.70 70.24   80.68  43.44  132.56
St. Lucia  2 49.75 40.25 59.26   67.72  58.26  77.19
St. Vincent and the Gren.  1 66.41 66.41 66.41   43.94  43.94  43.94
Suriname 7 50.28 50.05 50.51   14.33  7.27  21.88
Turkey 25 45.36 41.75 50.84   14.67  10.91  18.79
Uruguay 28 41.39 40.10 43.00   33.56  19.99  67.05








   Gini    Credit 
Country N  Mean  Min  Max    Mean  Min  Max 
Lower Middle 
Income 765  46.64 30.43 77.36   27.48 1.14  165.96
Angola 6  60.34 60.06 60.61   3.12 1.14  4.45
Armenia 15  45.68 39.59 54.42   7.86 3.09  23.42
Belize 7  55.57 50.58 59.07   41.33 37.26  46.80
Bhutan 3  48.17 48.07 48.27   14.60 11.48  18.08
Bolivia 22  53.61 44.10 58.26   38.22 4.47  63.04
Cameroon 19  47.69 43.96 49.51   16.93 6.66  28.14
Cape Verde  17  50.06 42.35 55.89   24.15 3.02  41.13
Cote d'Ivoire  32  48.89 38.20 59.84   28.93 14.91  41.22
Ecuador 28  50.59 42.81 61.64   21.63 12.91  40.67
Egypt, Arab Rep.  41  36.32 32.71 51.35   25.89 11.43  53.38
El Salvador  42  51.16 47.46 63.71   28.01 16.82  43.53
Georgia 10  45.44 43.14 47.55   6.45 3.31  11.31
Guatemala 29  54.27 42.14 57.89   17.43 11.25  29.04
Guyana 5  44.62 43.94 45.60   41.49 23.17  54.89
Honduras 24  55.94 52.46 72.79   31.34 13.84  46.60
India 46  35.35 31.99 44.51   19.46 7.84  36.37
Indonesia 29  34.98 32.19 38.59   28.29 9.04  53.53
Jordan 30  39.88 35.08 48.67   63.62 32.15  83.50
Lesotho 18  59.67 51.95 64.54   13.78 5.60  20.05
Moldova 13  41.22 37.24 44.46   14.78 4.45  29.68
Mongolia 11  35.69 34.15 38.72   13.49 6.25  32.63
Morocco 38  47.48 37.71 69.06   31.34 11.74  60.91
Nigeria 35  50.80 43.40 65.16   11.20 3.33  18.93
Pakistan 43  39.05 30.43 44.15   21.92 12.83  27.57
Papua New Guinea  11  49.05 40.62 52.56   15.07 12.37  17.95
Paraguay 19  50.98 37.51 55.35   22.09 13.18  29.03
Philippines 45  55.42 45.83 61.30   30.64 16.94  54.06
Senegal 17  44.93 39.50 58.56   18.13 14.51  26.10
Sri Lanka  27  45.33 32.52 57.22   18.55 7.74  28.71
Swaziland 13  55.25 49.07 77.36   14.14 10.92  18.83
Thailand 36  50.18 43.98 60.27   68.38 15.07  165.96
Tunisia 18  41.01 39.03 42.02   60.64 48.67  66.60
Vietnam 11  37.60 36.34 38.64   36.33 17.23  64.37









   Gini    Credit 
Country  N  Mean Min  Max    Mean Min  Max 
Low Income  439  46.91 29.70 75.08   12.23  1.10  41.41
Bangladesh  10 34.08 33.16 35.75   24.41 15.12 31.14
Benin  4 37.43 36.89 37.97   13.59 12.05 15.11
Burkina Faso  10  50.79 44.77 54.31   9.40  5.73  12.84
Burundi  15 37.40 34.17 41.02   19.81 14.25 27.95
Cambodia  10  44.64 43.77 45.73   5.52 3.14 7.64
Central  African  Rep.  2  61.41 60.96 61.86   5.14 4.50 5.78
Chad  4  40.85 40.75 40.92   3.35 2.77 3.96
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2  44.70 44.52 44.88   1.88  1.58  2.19
Ethiopia 25  37.64 30.39 44.22   18.45  9.90  30.20
Gambia, The  12  52.54 48.15 59.91   13.55  8.88  26.07
Ghana 25  38.69 35.59 42.79   6.98  1.40  15.52
Guinea-Bissau  15  43.72 36.30 54.61   4.08 1.49 7.62
Haiti  11 54.06 53.61 56.05   12.74 10.26 13.99
Kenya  39 61.34 49.80 75.08   25.82 12.19 34.96
Kyrgyz Republic  12  42.60 39.00 47.30   5.97  3.74  11.29
Lao  PDR  11  34.88 31.10 37.16   7.14 3.63 9.19
Madagascar 30  45.24 40.00 46.88   13.86  7.88  21.24
Malawi 25  58.57 39.45 72.33   11.14  4.95  20.12
Mali 18  44.17 37.51 53.00   13.48  8.13  17.11
Mauritania  14 43.66 38.79 47.50   25.61 16.53 41.41
Mozambique 10  42.82 40.15 46.01   11.27  8.31  15.39
Nepal 29  42.59 29.70 63.98   14.55  3.72  28.31
Niger 14  45.95 40.58 50.51   6.06  3.54  11.79
Rwanda  6 46.96 45.85 48.08   10.60 10.16 11.04
Sierra  Leone  32  58.14 45.31 67.51   3.98 1.89 7.78
Tanzania 12  39.55 36.06 44.50   7.97  3.08  15.09
Togo  2 35.13 35.13 35.14   16.52 16.48 16.57
Uganda  20  41.82 37.01 46.09   3.94 1.10 5.87











Figure A1: Income Inequality around the world 
Income inequality measured by the gini coefficient of gross income. Data is based on averages from 2000 to 2004. 
 
 
Figure A2: Financial Development around the world 
Financial development measured by the average volume of private credit over GDP from 2000 to 2004 
 
Figure A3: Financial Development, Economic Development, and Income Inequality 








> 120   (N=14)
70-120 (N=19)
40-70   (N=13)
20-40   (N=30)
< 20     (N=50)
N/A34 
 





Log of Credit over GDP Log of const. GDP (USD)
G
i
n
i
 
(
g
r
o
s
s
)